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Abstract The shipping industry shows potential for improvements in energy efficien-
cy. Nonetheless, shipping companies appear reluctant to adopt these seemingly cost-
efficient technical and operational measures aiming at reducing energy costs. Such
phenomenon is not specific to the shipping industry and is commonly referred to as the
energy efficiency gap. Decades of research in other sectors have contributed to the
development of taxonomy of economic, organizational and psychological barriers that
determine energy efficiency gaps through the use of a variety of research frameworks.
This article aims to apply this research in the shipping context through interviews and
review of existing literature and applications from other industries, with the objective of
providing useful insight for shipping managers. The article discusses examples of
barriers that are typical to shipping and that are related to information asymmetries
and power structures within organizations. Managers of shipping firms are encouraged
to look through their organizations in search of principal agent problems and power
structures among the possible causes for energy efficiency gaps in their companies’
operations and possibly strive towards organizational change.
Keywords Energy efficiency gap . Energymanagement . Energy policy . Shipping
Economics
1 Introduction
The challenge of abating the climate impact of the shipping sector can partly be met
through the adoption of technical and operational measures that increase energy
efficiency 1. The Second IMO Report demonstrated in 2009 that between 25
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1
Energy efficiency is defined in this paper as decreasing energy use (as opposed to energy cost) while
maintaining (or increasing) the level of service provided. “Efficiency” is thus contrasted with “conservation”,
which implies only a reduction in energy use. In shipping specifically, energy efficiency is often defined as the
ratio between energy and transportation work (e.g. the product of tones cargo and nautical miles).
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and 75 % of CO2 emissions could be reduced almost exclusively due to energy
efficiency measures (Buhaug et al. 2009), a statement which has later been verified by,
for example, Eide et al. (2011). In other words, a large potential for energy efficiency
improvement with significant economic impact is not realized. This paradoxical phe-
nomenon has been observed across various sectors and is generally referred to as an
energy efficiency gap (Jaffe and Stavins 1994).
Energy efficiency is increasingly becoming important, as global anthropogenic
emissions of CO2 need to be substantially reduced and as fossil fuels remain the
primary source of energy in many industrial processes (IPCC 2007). Furthermore,
rising energy prices are bound to increase pressure on companies’ bottom lines, and
energy efficiency is likely to remain on top of the agenda of many executives. As for
the shipping sector, its contribution to total global CO2 emissions is estimated at 3.3 %,
and as the world economy becomes larger, emissions are expected to grow further
(Buhaug et al. 2009). It has even been shown that the implementation of all available
cost-efficient technologies aiming at reducing fuel consumption or at curbing emissions
will not be sufficient in the case of shipping to counteract the effects of the growth of
the sector (Faber et al. 2011; Eide et al. 2011).
From the perspective of the legislator or policy maker, this calls for more effective
policy intervention in order to correct potential failures in markets and to ensure that
reductions are achieved. Within the International Maritime Organization (IMO), dis-
cussions are ongoing on the possible implementation of sector specific market-based
measures (MBM), and recently, the adoption of a set of indexes aiming at improving
the performance and design of vessels have been recommended 2. It was recently
demonstrated that emissions from shipping will continue to rise despite the policy
measures introduced through the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and the Ship
Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and that further measures are needed if
the shipping industry is to contribute to the efforts of counteracting climate change
(Bazari and Longva 2011).
From the perspective of a shipping company, it is more relevant to focus on what
prevents energy efficiency improvements within the organization and what can be done
to overcome existing barriers. If not for meeting the present and upcoming regulation,
shipping companies should try to overcome such energy efficiency gaps, since direct
fuel costs are likely to rise in the future. Other costs are likely to increase as well, as
other environmental externalities start being accounted for and as emission control
areas (ECAs) are being introduced. The role of energy efficiency as a critical success
factor for shipping companies is thus likely to be increasingly strengthened. The
question of how to achieve greater energy efficiency from the perspective of the
management of a shipping company has not yet been covered to any large extent in
shipping.
2 These indexes are the following: the Energy Efficiency Operational Index (EEOI), aiming at improving the
shipping operations; the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), targeting the energy consumption profile of
new designs; and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). In July 2011, the Parties to
MARPOL Annex VI accepted the amendments proposed in the Maritime and Environmental Committee of
IMO (MEPC 62) with resolution MEPC.203(62) and added a new chapter 4 to Annex VI of MARPOL. This
chapter addresses regulations on energy efficiency for ships and makes mandatory the EEDI for new ships and
the SEEMP for all ships.
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In this paper, previously developed frameworks, methods and results for research on
energy efficiency will be compared with data drawn from a literature on shipping as
well as interviews with different experts and business people in shipping. It will focus
on barriers to energy efficiency from the perspective of these actors. It will also indicate
what implications eliminating such barriers would have for the management of ship-
ping companies. The objective of the paper is to understand to what extent research
done on other sectors is applicable also to shipping, and to provide suggestions for
further research. The paper will argue that the role of managerial strategic decision
making in shipping cannot be understated when it comes to energy efficiency.
The paper is structured in the following way: A section detailing method (semi-
structured interviews) and scope of the paper will be followed by a discussion on what
is known on the potential for increasing energy efficiency in shipping from a technical
and economical point of view. Previous research on energy efficiency, especially
related to the energy efficiency gap, will be overviewed, after which, data from the
interviews will be presented in the context of this research. Finally, implications for
management of shipping companies will be discussed as well as directions for further
research.
2 Method and scope
The two main research questions guiding this article are the following: Given that a
large technical and economic potential exists, why do shipping organizations not act on
these seemingly cost-efficient opportunities? What insights can be gained from apply-
ing the frameworks developed from research on other sectors on the shipping sectors?
In order to explore these questions, 19 interviews were conducted between the
spring of 2009 and the autumn of 2010. Interviewees were selected from companies
in the Nordic shipping sector using a snow-balling method (Biernacki and Waldorf
1981). The intention was to locate people in companies that had a reputation of being
ambitious in terms of energy efficiency as well as in companies that appeared more
conservative in the implementation of new technologies. Also, interviewees were
sought in different parts of the organizations, with the criteria being that they were
likely to make decisions in their role that affected energy use. This means not only
technical managers in the case of a shipping company but also operational managers. In
addition to shipping companies, also classification societies, consultancies, suppliers of
measures and services to increase energy efficiency etc. were targeted.
The interviews were carried out using a semi-structured approach, i.e. through open-
ended questions that have been developed on the basis of existing theoretical frame-
work. Focus was put on shortcomings and barriers in energy management practices.
Cases from the interviews were compared to findings in other sectors and to energy
efficiency research in general.
3 The potential for increased energy efficiency in shipping
The shipping industry is an energy intense industry in the sense that energy costs
constitute a large portion of total operating costs. For a typical tanker, 50 % of total
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operating costs are energy related. Compared to other sectors, this is a very large ratio.
Thollander and Ottosson (2010), for example, in their paper on energy management
practices in Sweden, define energy intense production industries as those industries
with energy costs above 5 % and mostly between 5 and 20 %.
Compared to other transportation modes, shipping is in general considered to be
characterized by a relatively high energy efficiency levels (Buhaug et al. 2009). In some
sectors, however, such as short-sea shipping, the efficiency of shipping as opposed to
land-based transportation has been questioned, in particular with respect to SOx and
NOx emissions per transportation work and also when it comes to energy efficiency
(Hjelle 2010).
The potential for further improvement in energy efficiency has been demonstrated to
be substantial. Table 1 shows the breakdown of estimates made by Buhaug et al.
(2009). The measures are not only related to technical changes of existing ships and
new builds. Also operational measures are of high importance. Thus, from the view-
point of a shipping company, measures are found within different parts of the organi-
zation. Each measure potentially improves energy efficiency by a fraction of a percent-
age point up to few percentage points. Also, efficiency measures may be operational
(planning and executing a voyage efficiently), tactical (planning overhauls) or may
involve the organization at a more strategic level (new buildings). It will later be argued
that these characteristics of the set of measures impose certain demands on a shipping
organization in terms of how work with energy efficiency is effectively managed.
The estimates have later been discussed and confirmed by other researchers.
Lindstad et al. (2011) demonstrated that 28 % reduction in CO2 emissions could be
achieved by reduction of speed alone, at zero abatement cost 3. Eide et al. (2011)
assessed cost and reduction potential of various abatement measures in a model which
includes fleet growth projections, and conclude that a 33 % CO2 emission decrease
with respect to the baseline, could be achieved by 2030 at a zero marginal cost per ton
reduced.
Even though these potentials may appear large, they will not be enough to
reduce the total emissions from the shipping sector. For example, it is unlikely
that the shipping sector will be able to contribute to emission reductions in the
magnitude required for example by the European Commission, i.e. 40–50 % by
2050 (EC 2011). Faber et al. (2009) as well as Eide et al. (2011) demonstrated
that the gains in efficiency will be more than compensated through increased
transportation work as the world economy grows. Bazari and Longva (2011) showed
that policy measures introduced by the IMO, so far, will not be enough to stop total
shipping emissions from rising.
The problem is thus twofold: our current capacity to reduce emissions is insufficient,
as is the ability of shipping companies to implement apparently cost-efficient measures.
As Shove (1998) argued: “technical potential which cannot be realized for a range of
perfectly explicable sociotechnical reasons is not really technical potential, or at least it
is not technical potential which is of any relevance in the race to reduce CO2
emissions.” (p. 1110). This paper deals with this problem and its implication for the
management of shipping companies.
3 In this context, costs are taken to be fuel, time charter and cargo costs.
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4 Frameworks and results in previous energy efficiency research
The existence of an energy efficiency gap has been of interest to researchers, managers
and policy makers since the oil crises of the 70s: if the potential is great, why so little
action? The building sector has been particularly well researched. For example, some
performance indicators in the Swedish building sector have actually stagnated: the
average specific energy use for heating new buildings was shown to be twice as high as
the best performing buildings 20 years earlier (Nässén et al. 2008). Nässén and
Holmberg (2005) identified, among other reasons, weak rules and regulations, strong
building companies and weak contractors and incentives for changing user behaviour
for this development. Ryghaug and Sørensen (2009) argue in the case of Norway that
this is due to a conservative building industry, deficiencies in public policy as well as
limited governmental efforts. Pinkse and Dommisse (2009) showed that companies that
were more actively seeking information as well as building internal technical capacities
were more likely to adopt cost-efficient measures.
This gap has been quantified and explained in further sectors, such as the Swedish
foundry industry (Rohdin et al. 2007), the Swedish paper and pulp industry (Thollander
and Ottosson 2008), the German commercial and services sector (Schleich 2009), the
Indian household sector (Reddy 2003), the Greek industrial sector (Sardianou 2008),
the American department of defence (Umstattd 2009), etc. but has not yet been
discussed to the same extent in the context of shipping. The topic has been treated
outside of peer-reviewed literature: Buhaug et al. (2009) discuss contractual arrange-
ments as affecting the realization of operational measures. Faber et al. (2011) argued for
the existence of technical, institutional and financial barriers. Missing from these
reports is the theoretical context given below, the relationship to findings in other
sectors as well as barriers related more to organization and behaviour. Moreover, they
are focused on implications for policy rather than management.
Before the shipping sector is treated specifically, a general overview of energy
efficiency research will be given. In the next section, this material will be used to
Table 1 Measures for CO2 reductions, adapted from Buhaug et al. (2009)
Saving (%) of CO2 per tonne-mile Combined Total
Design (new ships)
Concept, speed and capability 2–50 10–50 % 25–75 %
Hull and superstructure 2–20
Power and propulsion systems 5–15
Low-carbon fuelsa 5–15
Renewable energya 1–10
Exhaust gas CO2 reductiona 0
Operations (all ships)
Fleet management, logistics and incentives 5–50 10–50 %
Voyage optimization 1–10
Energy management 1–10
a These are measures that reduce CO2 emissions without necessarily increasing energy efficiency
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discuss data gathered on shipping. Energy efficiency is a multidisciplinary research
topic. Researchers have found it useful to discuss data through different frameworks in
order to find adequate explanations for what determines energy efficiency gaps and
barriers in the various sectors. A multidisciplinary approach is also needed as focus is
moved from markets to organizations to the behaviour of individuals within a single
firm. Collingridge and Reeve (1986) argued that this is typical for problems related to
policy: they do not arrange themselves nicely within one discipline.
Part of the explanation could be that new superior technologies typically diffuse
gradually, requiring communicational channels and a supporting social system (Rogers
1962). Technical change is path dependent, due to positive feedback processes and
increasing returns to adoption (Arthur 1994). It could still be worthwhile to investigate
whether the present level of diffusion is optimal from a societal perspective—some
barriers to diffusion could be cost efficient to remove. This may apply especially for the
introduction of more advanced technologies in meeting long-term climate targets
(Sandén and Azar 2005).
A common approach has been to explain this gap in terms of barriers, here defined
as an obstacle to an actor in reaching a certain goal in terms of energy efficiency (Weber
Fig. 1 Potentials and barriers to energy efficiency, adapted and simplified from Jaffe and Stavins (1994)
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1997). Different types of barriers have been developed and discussed in relation to
markets, institutions, organizations or individual behaviour (Sorrell et al. 2004), thus
drawing upon research from different fields. A barrier model, as defined by Weber
(1997), is characterized by “what is an obstacle to whom reaching what in energy
conservation”. One of the advantages of using the conceptual model developed by
Weber is that it places energy use in a social context and thus broadens the view from a
purer technical or economical potential perspective. For example, an economic agent in
a specific social setting may look for and implement energy-saving measures while he
or she may not be, in another, independent of actual potential. The model explains this
occurrence in terms of barriers—perhaps related to hierarchies and power structures
that slow innovation in the organization, lack of management attention etc.—that
hinder this economic agent from achieving higher energy efficiency.
The concept of barriers can be used to explain the difference between a hypothetical
potential and what is actually observed, as seen in Fig. 1. A hypothetical potential
changes in reality towards the narrow social optimum, as eliminating barriers come at a
cost, and not all barriers are cost efficient to remove from a societal perspective. A true
social optimum is reached when environmental externalities are accounted for. In this
article, three sets of barriers will be discussed: barriers derived from neoclassical
economics, from transaction cost economics and from organizational theory and
management.
4.1 Information barriers
The first perspective discussed in this paper is that of neoclassical economics. Rational
actors, such as private firms, are expected to systematically adopt available measures
for increasing energy efficiency in order to maximize profits. If the market is unable to
exploit to the cost-saving potential of certain measures, this is due to market barriers
and/or failures that hinder their uptake4.
Market failures can be divided into three main categories: incomplete markets,
imperfect competition and information asymmetries. Thollander and Ottosson (2008)
argued that the latter are more interesting to study in an energy efficiency context,
which will also be the focus of this article.
One reason as to why information barriers are of importance in the field of energy
efficiency is that information related to energy use and efficiency can be said to have
the qualities of a public good. As such, it is typically underprovided by ordinary market
activity, giving rise to information barriers. For example, an adopter of a measure with
unclear savings is taking a risk, the result (and information) of which other potential
adopters receive the benefits, leading to an under-supply of information regarding that
particular measure (Sorrell et al. 2004).
With respect to information, different types of goods are expected to affect market
failure to different extents. Economists typically divide goods into three categories,
namely search goods, experience goods and credence goods (Nelson 1970; Stern
1986). With the first type of good, it is possible for the customer to acquire information
4 The distinction used in this paper is that of Jaffe and Stavins (1994): market failures are a subset of market
barriers, characterized by the fact that their removal passes a cost/benefit test from a societal perspective. See
also Fig. 1.
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on quality, performance etc. of a good before purchase. Experience goods need to be
used by the customer before quality attributes, performance and other characteristics
can be determined. Lastly, credence goods are goods where it is difficult to gather
information even after purchase and use. The more difficult it is for a buyer to assess
these characteristics, the more severe the barriers (Sorrell et al. 2004) are. Akerlof
(1970) demonstrated that markets where it is difficult for buyers to assess the quality of
goods, sellers are incentivized to market goods of poorer-than-average quality, leading
to a reduction of the average quality of goods. As will be argued later, these are
characteristics also of shipping markets.
Examples of information asymmetries include split incentives, adverse selection and
moral hazard: the first being perhaps the most well known of energy efficiency barriers.
A common example of a split incentive problem is where the party that would be the
adopter of a particular energy efficiency measure could be aware of the possibilities but
does not realize them, as another party bears the energy costs and would thus receive
the benefits. In the building sector, these are known as landlord-tenant problems
(Blumstein et al. (1980) for example, contains several case studies).
The distinction between adverse selection and moral hazard is that they are cases of
asymmetric information applying before and after a contractual agreement, respectively
(Arrow 1963; Sorrell et al. 2004). Before the agreement, there may be reasons for a
vendor of a particular product to under-provide information on quality or performance.
After the agreement, moral hazard problems may arise, especially if performance with
respect to the contract is difficult to measure. These problems are often described as
principal-agent relationships, where an agent is either acting on the behalf of or
providing a service for a principal but with partly differing sets of information and
goals (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Sharma 1997). This would lead the agent to act
opportunistically, i.e. to always optimize performance with respect to his or her own
agenda at a cost for the principal.
Principal-agent problems have been shown to have substantial impacts on processes
to improve energy efficiency. In a review of case studies in five countries carried out by
the International Energy Agency, principal-agent problems alone affected energy use
for 3,8 EJ or 85 % of the total energy used in Spain in 2005 (de T’Serclaes and Jollands
2007). Furthermore, from a policy perspective, these problems are said to be difficult to
target through single policy interventions. de T'Serclaes and Jollands (2007, p. 192) that
principal-agent problems are “pervasive, disbursed and complex” and argues that
sector-specific and country-specific sets of policies need to be designed.
Market barriers that are not market failures in the Jaffe and Stavins’ frame-
work include a perception of higher risk for energy efficiency measures (thus
imposing stricter pay-off criteria), low access to capital, hidden costs for
implementation (production disruptions, staff training etc.) and heterogeneity of actors
(a measure that is cost efficient on average may not be so in the case of a particular actor)
(Sorrell et al. 2004).
4.2 Barriers due to transaction costs
Relying only on neoclassical economic theory for identifying energy efficiency barriers
will not be sufficient to explain the full picture. An early criticism was of the
proposition that firms always maximize profit and consumers always maximize utility.
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Transaction cost economics provides a useful extension also in the context of energy
efficiency. Not only are actors bounded in this framework but there are also different
kinds of market transactions and corresponding governance structures. Thus, not only
market failures are interesting from a policy intervention’s point of view but also
organizational failures. Two kinds of organizational transaction costs can be discerned:
those related to establishing organizations and those related to running organizations.
The former includes such aspects as the cost of setting up, maintaining or changing
organizational and incentive designs and information technology. The latter include
costs of decision making, monitoring the execution of orders, measuring performance
of workers, agency costs and cost of information management, as well as physical
transfer costs, such as goods and services across some interface. When it comes to
market transaction costs, these are associated with search and information costs,
bargaining and decision costs, as well as supervision and enforcement costs
(Furubotn and Richter 2005). Bounded rationality explains the existence of organiza-
tional inertia, implying that all other things being equal, actors favour status quo rather
than utility maximization (e.g. Kelly and Amburgey 1991). In this extended frame-
work, the discussion becomes more interesting from the viewpoint of the management
of a company.
4.3 Organizational barriers
While the transaction cost approach provides more ways in which to analyse and
discuss what is going on inside the “black box” of an organization, a the third set of
barriers, taking an organizational theory or management perspective, can provide even
further understanding. However, this area is still rather unexplored and not much
research has been produced in the context of energy efficiency. Sorrell et al. (2000)
described it in 2000 as being “the least developed”, and a decade later, Thollander and
Ottosson (2010) still point to a gap in research literature when it comes to understand-
ing actual energy management practices and strategies in companies. Hilliard and
Jamieson (2011) similarly found “no field studies of expert cognitive work in
demand-side energy management.” Bunse et al. (2011) discussed a gap between
scientific literature and industrial needs for management solutions. Some positive
examples are Selmer (1994) who studied management practices through longitudinal
case studies of five companies in the building sector and Cebon (1992) who studied
behavioural aspects of energy management at two universities. He argued that while
organization in itself cannot be said to be a barrier to energy efficiency,
organizational structures affect and constrain what choices actors within an
organization make. Rohdin et al. (2007) highlighted the importance of the energy
efficiency “champion”, or simply “people with real ambition” who will work on energy
efficiency despite lack of formal incentives.
Beyond barrier theory, there are also more interdisciplinary approaches to analysing
energy efficiency. Palm (2009) used lifestyle categorization from research on house-
holds adapted to explain attitudes to energy efficiency in industrial small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Nässén et al. (2008) combined an econometric approach with
interviews to explain stagnating energy efficiency in the Swedish building sector.
Ryghaug and Sørensen (2009) studied the Norwegian building industry from the
supply-side point of view and concluded that lack of public policy, a conservative
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industry and low government interest were main causes of why energy efficiency
“fails”. Shove (1998) criticized the use of barrier models altogether because of its
focus on the distinction between social and technical, favouring instead frameworks
which “suggests that technical change is an unremittingly social, and thus contextual,
localized and temporally specific, process.” (p. 1109). She further highlights the social
context of energy efficiency:
“Imagine a designer keen on energy conservation and equipped with up-to-date
knowledge about energy saving methods and measures. Let us say that this
person works in the public sector, designing housing schemes within a local
authority. The designer’s capacity to put his or her energy saving knowledge into
practice depends, in significant part, upon the organization’s internal accounting
practices, on the current priorities of local and national government, and upon the
division of labour between relevant building and housing professionals. If this
designer leaves the local authority and gets a new job in the private sector, the
translation of knowledge into practice will be governed by quite different con-
siderations. In this context, the designer’s energy related choices would reflect the
need to produce marketable properties at a profit, rather than the need to conform
to standard cost guidelines or to produce houses that tenants can afford to heat.
Thus the same person with the same psychological propensity for risk taking, and
confronting the same decisions (in this case, decisions about housing design), will
arrive at different solutions depending upon the organizational environment in
which he or she happens to operate.” (p. 1108)
In her framework and this example, the concept of barriers becomes more
difficult to apply.
5 Barriers to energy efficiency in shipping—an analysis of interviews
The above framework was used as an underlying guideline for the interviews carried
out. The aim was to understand whether this framework was useful as a tool for
discussing the shortcomings and barriers regarding energy efficiency as described by
the interviewees, and as an implication, that the solutions put forward in other sectors
would possibly have an impact also in shipping. In total, 19 interviews were conducted,
with some respondents being contacted more than once. In terms of profession,
interviewees included chief engineers, master mariners, naval architects, environmental
managers, ship operators, general managers, energy efficiency equipment vendors,
energy efficiency consultants, shipping company CEOs, ship owners and more. In
the analysis, cases described by them will be discussed in terms of the above
framework.
This discussion will be divided into the discussed barriers, focusing on market and
organizational barriers. In some cases, this division may seem somewhat artificial as
examples in practical terms may fall into more than one category. As barriers are an
attempt to explain the energy efficiency gap within different theoretical frameworks,
this is perhaps not so surprising. Sorrell et al. (2000) also noted that barriers should be
seen as perspectives to highlight interesting features rather than discrete variables.
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Especially the concepts of principal-agent problems and split incentives overlap. The
framework seems well suited to discuss problems found also in shipping. Some special
characteristics of shipping might even make increasing energy efficiency even more
difficult compared to other sectors, despite a relatively higher energy intensity.
5.1 The role of information asymmetries in shipping
From a shipping market perspective, imperfect information seems to be a significant
barrier. The theoretical starting point is that since information is typically
underprovided by ordinary market activity, actors lack proper basis for taking econom-
ically efficient decisions. An investment decision regarding an energy efficiency
measure is from an economic perspective typically a trade-off between initial capital
cost and potentially lower future energy costs (Gillingham et al. 2009). Therefore,
increasing certainty in the prediction of future savings as well as future energy costs and
expected lifetime of the measure, among other aspects, become critical. Throughout the
interviews, three main patterns concerning difficulties in implementing measures as a
consequence of these aspects could be seen.
Firstly, interviewees in the position of ship operators or owners explained that
vendors of energy efficiency measures could approach them with a range of energy
saving “devices” but without convincing measures or data available for proving
actual savings. One ship owner explained that “if we add them altogether, we can
save more than 100 %”. Insufficient information, in the sense that they did not
believe that they were able to verify or trust the claims regarding the estimated
savings was, in this case, a barrier for them in investing in a measure.
Secondly, a number of company representatives elaborated on difficulties of
assessing energy performance of their own ships—another form of imperfect
information. Due to varying weather conditions, the quality of measuring equip-
ment, efficiency of reporting systems etc., there could be so much noise in the
information that it becomes very difficult to prove the effectiveness of measures. In
one case, a shipping company had proven the efficiency of a measure in a testing
environment, as well as on trial runs in a towing tank but could not see the savings
in day-to-day operational data. Consequently, they did not continue with the
measure on a fleet-wide basis. Interviewees also stated that measurement inaccu-
racy and noise reduced transparency of energy costs within their respective
organization, making it difficult to set unambiguous benchmarks and select best
practices.
Thirdly, lack of information regarding future energy costs could also be a barrier. A
technical project manager in one shipping company explained that it was a com-
pany policy to use the last month’s bunker oil price to calculate payback times for
projects. Even though oil prices were rising, they were also fluctuating, making it
difficult to plan projects correctly with dockings and access to the right personnel.
Furthermore, the use of payback time itself has been criticized (Narayanan 1985),
making application of the concept in energy efficiency questionable.
Problems of information asymmetries seem to appear in many forms in shipping,
both in terms of markets and within organizations. A large numbers of actors can be
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involved in providing a shipping service, separated geographically and managerially,
potentially opening up for many problems related to information, and concurrently,
principal agent problems.
Examples include freight contracts where the cargo owner pays bunker prices, when
management of technical maintenance is separated from the commercial management
with responsibilities for the fuel bill or when a ship is procured. In the last example, the
phenomena of adverse selection implies that potential energy efficiency measures are
not accounted for in the value of the ship, as the transaction costs involved for the
procurer in using the discounted values of an energy efficiency investment is too large.
Moreover, these values may be small compared to the total asset value of the ship.
Moral hazard tells us that the shipyard is expected to maximize on those areas that are
not specified and monitored by the procurer. Akerlof’s market of lemons (Akerlof
1970) tells us that in markets where the buyer knows more about the quality of a good
than the seller (that is, they are experience or credence goods), average quality of goods
will deteriorate. In this theoretical context then, energy inefficient ships are a natural
consequence of information asymmetries. This was a concern raised by several inter-
viewees, as they perceived that it could be difficult to assess the performance of their
ships in different operational condition.
A technical management optimizing the financial performance of their department
may wish to reduce expenses for maintenance, at a higher total cost for the company
due to higher fuel consumption (Buhaug et al. 2009). In the principal-agent formula-
tion, this is expected if actions taken by the agent are invisible to the principal, giving
rise to a moral hazard problem. This could also be described as a problem of split
incentives as discussed below.
The solution model proposed by agency theory is that contracts should be
better constructed. An example from shipping is the case where a ship operator
may have financial incentives not to slow down in respect to contractual speed,
as he receives demurrage while waiting in port before the contractual arrival
time, while the cargo owner pays costs of fuel. The “virtual arrival” process,
where vessels upon receiving information of a delay at their upcoming port
reduce speed in order to arrive in time for unloading is an example of resolving
contractual issues that affect energy efficiency. An external verification service
would calculate what the fuel consumption and arrival time would have been should the
ship have continued on its initial contract speed. This kind of process could then be used
to share savings between cargo owner and ship operator, with the operator still
receiving demurrage.
Split incentive problems seem to be widespread in shipping. Sorrell et al. (2000) put
it: “It is necessary to ask, what are the personal incentives for investing in energy
efficiency?”. As many measures in shipping are operational, investing in this sense
could be broadened to include also day-to-day decisions. A consultant working on
improving energy efficiency in shipping companies explained in an interview that
usually, there is a paradox in that no one in the shipping organization is truly
accountable for energy costs and cost reduction. Moreover, a master mariner explained
that there could be large variations in the company between the performances of
different crews when it comes to fuel efficient operation (vessel trim, speed profile,
route planning etc.), but as the crew is generally not evaluated on or held accountable
for energy efficiency, little incentives exist for improvement.
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5.2 Organizational barriers
Throughout this project, the authors met interviewees that worked or were working in
organizations where they felt that they were discouraged to work on energy efficiency. A
senior chief engineer specifically mentioned that he had been strongly discouraged by
management in several positions he held across different shipping companies from
making any efforts in improving the energy efficiency profile of the ship where he was
working, with the exception of the company where he was currently employed. He had
now been able to receive funding for several projects, all which had had short payback
times for the company. This is in line with the argument fromCebon (1992) above that the
organization itself places constraints on actions of employees and also similar to the case
of the designer described in the quote above from Shove (1998). Literature on resistance to
change in organizations can also provide insight in this context (Nevis 1987):
“If we look at how managers define their jobs, we see responsibility for initiating
change as one of the major tasks. At any given level of hierarchy, a manager does
not expect those who are subordinate to that level will initiate change, and when
subordinates do, they generally have a hard time with it” (p. 145).
A general pattern described by interviewees was based on the consideration that
people in a shipping organization who may be directly observing and influencing actual
energy use, that is the ship crew, may be organizationally far from those responsible for
implementing energy efficiency improvements and are rarely accounted for in the
decision-making process. On the other end, ship charterers and operators also make
decisions that clearly affect energy consumption, through, e.g. speed and other opera-
tional provisions in the charter party. In more than one shipping company, interviewees
explained that parts of the organization might not have sufficient knowledge or
information regarding energy performance of different ships in different loading
conditions and speeds, effectively rendering it very difficult for them to take energy-
efficient operational decisions on speed for a given cargo and voyage.
6 Addressing barriers in a shipping company
It emerged from the interviews that the availability of energy saving measures is not in
itself a barrier. Indeed, the surveys mentioned above made by various organizations
suggest that the possibilities for increased energy efficiency, through existing knowl-
edge and technology, are very large. It is also clear from the interviews, because of
reasons related to availability of and trust in information and related to contractual
forms as well as organizational factors such as the ability to foster innovation, many
shipping companies seem to lack the ability to systematically address energy efficiency
within their organizations. Thus, a part of the problem is found in the way a shipping
company is managed. In many cases, shipping companies should examine their
organizations and pursue a process of organizational change to address the energy
efficiency challenges they are faced with.
As what was mentioned earlier in this paper, in general, too little research exists to
provide understanding of what are appropriate management practices concerning
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energy efficiency (Sorrell et al. 2000; Thollander and Ottosson 2010; Bunse et al.
2011). This also applies to shipping. In literature on organizational aspects and effects
on organizational performance, the issues discussed above have not been explicitly
covered. The outsourcing of day-to-day operations to third party ship management has
been covered extensively by Mitroussi (2003, 2004). In the theoretical framework
already outlined (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979)) as well as according to empirical
findings (de T’Serclaes and Jollands 2007), these kinds of principal- agent arrange-
ments severely impact energy efficiency in the absence of effective monitoring. This
would imply that for many shipping organizations, energy efficiency is a contractual
problem in the sense of Williamson (1979). That is the problem of “economizing on
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transaction in question
against the hazards of opportunism” (p. 246).
A way forward for shipping companies in addressing energy efficiency more
systematically could be through the application of best practices. While it has been
argued that there exists no one solution that fits all companies when it comes to
managing energy (Russell 2005), many best practices or standards for use in organi-
zations to manage work with energy efficiency were developed during the last decade.
A Danish standard, DS 2403, was produced in 2001. A Swedish standard, SS 62 77 50,
was introduced in 2003 as part of a governmental energy efficiency programme called
“Programme för energieffektivisering” (Programme for energy efficiency, (PFE)). A
European standard, EN 16001, followed in 2009 and an international ISO standard,
ISO 50 001, was released in 2011. The aim of the ISO 50001 standard is “to enable
organizations to establish the systems and processes necessary to improve energy
performance, including energy efficiency, use and consumption”, through setting a
framework “[…] upon which an organization can develop and implement and energy
policy, and establish objectives, targets and action plans which take into account legal
requirements and information related to significant energy use” (ISO 2011). It also
requires that an organization incorporates energy efficiency in procurement and
design processes. A similar development has started in shipping: the IMO has
developed a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (IMO 2012), OCIMF has
revised its TMSA to include also energy efficiency (OCIMF 2009) and Intertanko has
produced a Guide for a Tanker Energy Efficiency Management Plan (Intertanko
2009). However, there may be room for improvement, particularly of the SEEMP
(Johnson et al. 2013).
Finally, some aspects which make it likely that these standards improve the perfor-
mance of organizations should be mentioned. Specifically from the analysis in this
paper, what seems to be required is a greater emphasis on monitoring and follow-up of
performance, both internally within the company and with respect to external contracts.
Further, an organizational structure should be supportive of innovative ideas. Indeed,
previous studies on energy efficiency in other sectors highlight the importance of the
energy efficiency “champion” or “people with real ambition” (Rohdin et al. 2007), who
will work on energy efficiency despite lack of formal incentives. In an evaluation of the
Swedish PFE programme, researchers have noted difficulties in verify “a direct cau-
sality” between the implementation of an energy management system, and gains in
energy efficiency (Stenqvist and Nilsson 2011). However, companies in the programme
claimed that the energy management system had helped establishing an organizational
structure with a strong focus on energy efficiency. Eighty percent of the companies
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claimed that the implementation of the standard had introduced new methods for
monitoring energy use that were valuable for their energy efficiency improvements.
7 Discussion and further research
Our analysis showed that there is an energy efficiency gap in shipping and that such an
efficiency gap can be analysed in terms of the theoretical frameworks used in other
sector. Moreover, the study has contributed to improve the understanding of the
complexity of the issue in the case of shipping. Compared to other sectors, many
barriers related to information asymmetries could even be augmented due to the
geographically and organizationally fragmented nature of many shipping sectors.
From this perspective, it can be argued that energy efficiency is not only a technical
challenge but also very much a question of effective management.
The scope of this article is limited to shipping and its organization. It is thus limited
in the sense that it does not directly include cargo owners. This would have been
relevant as choices made up or downstream very much affect choices available for
shipping actors. Similar studies could be done that focused on barriers in a particular
market segment, product supply chain or region. The study has also focused on the
implications of the existence of barriers to management of shipping companies.
Previous studies on shipping, outside academic literature, have emphasized the impli-
cations for policy making. The frameworks described and used in this study could also
be expanded into this field, particularly transaction cost theory and organizational and
management aspects.
From this study, some particular areas may be of particular interest to study further:
& Given the emphasis that transaction cost economics puts on the role of monitoring
performance vis-à-vis contracts, understanding further the role and use of monitor-
ing of energy use in various forms of contracts—new buildings, third party
management, charter parties etc.—as well as internally, this would be an interesting
topic for further research.
& Moreover, it would be valuable to understand further how knowledge and compe-
tence on energy issues can be enhanced internally in shipping organizations, for
example, through applying various available “best practices”. Many best practices
exist in the area of systematic energy efficiency management, for example, the ISO
50001 and the IMO SEEMP. Studies could focus on the challenges and effects of
their implementation within different types of shipping companies. These studies
could address more general critical success factors for organizational change related
to energy efficiency, the role of different organizational structures, incentive struc-
tures and the impact of contractual arrangements.
8 Conclusions
Pressure on the shipping industry to reduce its environmental impacts will increase and
the most cost-efficient route to CO2 emission reduction will be through increased
energy efficiency. Recent assessments have showed that improved managerial practices
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when it comes to energy efficiency is the only way to reach emission reductions in the
short term—the process to replace today’s ships with new more energy efficient ships
will be slow. Concurrently, there seem to be many barriers that hinder companies from
realizing this potential. There is thus a gap between the social need, the potential and
what measures are actually being implemented among shipping companies. Our study
has contributed to improve the understanding of the complexity of the issue in the case
of shipping. A number of key areas as to why this gap exists have been highlighted
through interviews and an overview of research in other sectors.
Barriers to energy efficiency in shipping may arise in a shipping organization due to
the following:
& Uncertainties and asymmetries in information regarding effectiveness of measures
as well as of day-to-day performance
& Fragmentation of responsibilities and action concerning energy use, within firms as
well as in contracts between different firms. This is expected to be particularly
aggravating in the absence of monitoring.
& Organizational structures that inhibit learning and innovation
Further research is thus necessary to understand the role of energy use and efficiency
internally in a shipping organization as well as in its relationship with other organiza-
tions. Two ways in which to accomplish this has been suggested:
& Understanding further the role and use of monitoring of energy use in various forms
of contracts—new buildings, third party management, charter parties etc., as well as
internally.
& Understanding further how knowledge and competence on energy issues can be
enhanced internally in shipping organizations, for example, through applying
various available “best practices”.
An important effect goal of this study was to contribute to further appreciation in the
research community of the question of why shipping firms fail to improve energy
efficiency so that more studies are carried out in the near future. The matter is urgent
from a global societal perspective and concurrently, represents substantial business
opportunities.
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